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INTRODUCTION 
It is common knowledge that middle- and upper-class parents tend 
to disfavor urban public schools, and that they often move to suburbs in 
order to avoid having to send their children to those schools.1 Thus, the 
condition of urban public schools contributes to suburban sprawl—that is, 
the movement of people and jobs from city to suburb. Because most 
suburbs are highly dependent on automobiles,2 such sprawl makes it more 
difficult for people without cars to reach jobs and other destinations, as well 
                                                 
*Associate Professor, Touro Law Center. Wesleyan University, B.A.; University of 
Pennsylvania, J.D.; University of Toronto, L.L.M. 
1. See, e.g., Erika K. Wilson, Gentrification and Urban Public School Reforms: The 
Interest Divergence Dilemma, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 680 (2015) (in recent decades, 
“white middle-class residents either avoided the public schools or moved out of the city once 
they had school-aged children.”). 
 2. Cf. OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY 4 (2002) (citing numerous definitions 
of sprawl, some of which emphasize automobile-oriented development). 
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as increasing greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of automobile-
related pollution.3 
This Article discusses a variety of possible solutions to the 
unpopularity of urban schools among middle-class parents. Part I of this 
Article suggests that this problem is a cause as well as a result of middle-
class flight: that is, urban schools have poor reputations because their 
students come from lower-class backgrounds, thus causing poor test scores, 
thus causing poor reputations, thus causing additional middle-class flight. 
Part II of this Article describes the legal doctrines that have led to the status 
quo. Part III discusses the pros and cons of several policies that might lure 
middle-class families into cities, focusing on policies designed to enhance 
parental choice. This Article concludes that each of these solutions could 
make cities more appealing to affluent parents, but no solution is cost-free. 
I. THE PROBLEM: NO BAD SCHOOLS, ONLY WEAK STUDENTS 
Why are urban public schools so disreputable? It could be argued 
that cities have a weaker tax base than suburbs and that urban schools are 
therefore underfunded.4 But where suburban school districts are of 
comparable size to their big-city counterparts, urban school districts 
actually outspend suburban districts.5 Table 1 compares suburban districts 
with over 50,000 students with their urban counterparts. 
 
TABLE 1: City vs. Suburban Spending Per Pupil6 
 
Atlanta Metro Area 
 
Atlanta    12,994 
                                                 
 3. See generally Reid Ewing et al., Growing Cooler: The Evidence on Urban 
Development and Climate Change, available at 
http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/growingcoolerCH1.pdf (more compact, 
urbanized development likely to lead to reduced driving, which in turn will reduce auto 
emissions); Maggie L. Grabow et al., Air Quality and Exercise-Related Health Benefits from 
Reduced Car Travel in the Midwestern United States (Nov. 2, 2011), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3261937/ (discussing other forms of harm 
from auto emissions). 
 4. See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Urban Sprawl and the Constitution: Educational 
Inequality as an Impetus to Low-Density Living, 42 URB. LAW. 95, 102 (2010) (discussing 
“inadequate funding of America’s urban public schools” as a potent disincentive for urban 
life). 
 5. I focus on larger districts because of the difficulties of data collection where 
suburbia is divided into dozens of small districts. Also, it is not clear to me whether a district 
of one or two schools is comparable to a district with dozens of schools. 
 6. Public Education Finances: 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 8 (issued June 2016) 
available at http://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/econ/g14-
aspef.pdf (“2014 Finances”) (statistics for District of Columbia); id. at 25-26 (other 
statistics). 
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Fulton County   9,638 
 
Gwinnett County   9,270 
 
DeKalb County       8,847  
 
Cobb County    8,651 
 
Dallas/Fort Worth Metro Area 
  
Dallas    8,609 
 
Fort Worth   8,641 
 
Plano     8,374 
 
Garland   8,135 
 
Arlington   7,793 
 
Baltimore Metro Area 
 
Baltimore   15,564 
 
Howard County   15,358 
 
Baltimore County  13,338 
 
Anne Arundel County  13,167 
 
Denver Metro Area 
 
Denver    10,564 
 
Jefferson County  8,685 
 
Douglas County  8,182 
 
Houston Metro Area 
 
Houston    8,451 
 
Fort Bend   7,691 
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Katy    8,240 
 
Washington, D.C. Metro Area 
 
Washington    18,485 
 
Fairfax County   13,710 
 
Montgomery County  15,181 
 
Prince George’s County  13,994 
 
Prince William County  10,216 
 
Loudoun County  12,485 
 
Table 1 reveals a consistent pattern: urban districts always spend 
more per pupil than their suburban counterparts. 
Even where urban school districts significantly outspend their 
suburban counterparts, they fail to attract affluent families. In Kansas City, 
Missouri, court-ordered spending caused the city schools to spend three 
times as much as some suburban school districts during the 1980s.7 
Nevertheless, city test scores failed to improve significantly,8 and the city 
schools continued to lose white and middle-class families.9 Today, 89.4% 
of Kansas City students are poor enough to be eligible for subsidized 
meals10—a percentage higher than most big-city school districts.11 
Admittedly, students in low-income areas may cost more to 
educate, either because of the inherent disadvantages of growing up with 
poverty or because these children may be more likely to suffer from limited 
English proficiency or learning disabilities.12 Thus, it might be the case that 
                                                 
 7. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 74-79 (1995) (describing history of 
desegregation litigation that led to increased spending); id. at 99 (stating that Kansas City 
schools spent between $7,665 and $9,412 per pupil, while suburbs spend between $2,854 
and $5,956 per pupil). 
 8. See Molly G. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic 
Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1352-53 (2004). 
 9. See Michael Lewyn, The Law of Sprawl: A Road Map, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
147, 167 n.26 (2006). 
 10. See District Demographic Data, MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUC., 
http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/District%20and%20Building%20Student%20Indicat
ors/District%20Demographic%20Data.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (2014 data; 
percentage has risen from seventy-nine percent in 2006). 
 11. See infra Table 2. 
 12. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 699 (“poor students tend to have more social and 
academic needs due to the effects of concentrated poverty”); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
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if city schools outspent suburbs by (for example) a ten-to-one margin, 
disadvantages arising from family background might be appreciably 
narrowed. Since this strategy has never been tried and does not seem 
politically feasible in today’s political climate, I am agnostic about its likely 
success or failure. 
It could also be argued that urban school districts are disreputable 
merely because school districts are incompetently run and that better school 
boards or better mayors would therefore solve the problem of urban 
schools.13 But if school maladministration were the major cause of the 
school gap, urban schools would perform poorly regardless of their student 
demographics. In fact, urban schools that can screen out low achievers 
perform as well as suburban schools. For example, according to U.S. News 
and World Report, nine of the ten best high schools in New York State are 
within the City of New York.14 All but one of these urban schools are 
“exam schools” that screen out low-achieving students.15 
Moreover, urban schools often perform well as long as their student 
bodies are relatively affluent. For example, one study of Buffalo’s public 
schools showed a strong correlation between the share of a school’s student 
body living in poverty and its results on standardized mathematics tests.16 
                                                                                                                 
Per Pupil Spending Between Selected Inner-City Schools and Suburban Schools Varied by 
Metropolitan Area, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Ways and 
Means, House of Representatives 1, 5-6 (Dec. 2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03234.pdf. I note that this 2002 study found that city 
schools were outspent by suburbs in some metropolitan areas; however, even this study 
found a fairly even division between regions where cities spent more and those where 
suburbs spent more. Id. at 8 (city schools better funded in Boston, Chicago, and St. Louis, 
while suburbs received more funding in New York and Fort Worth). 
 13. Cf. Michael Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the 
Expansion of School Choice Policy, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1937 (2012) (“criticizing 
the bureaucracy of urban school districts as inefficient and corrupt is a popular sport among 
many legislators and governors”). 
 14. See Best High Schools in New York (2017), U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-high-schools/new-york (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) 
(listing best schools as Lehman High School of American Studies, High School for Dual 
Language and Asian Studies, Queens High School for the Sciences, Brooklyn Latin, 
Baccalaureate School for Global Education, Staten Island Technical High School, Bronx 
High School of Science, Townsend Harris High School, one suburban school, and the High 
School for Math, Science and Engineering at City College of New York). 
 15. See CHESTER E. FINN & JESSICA A. HOCKETT, EXAM SCHOOLS: INSIDE AMERICA’S 
MOST SELECTIVE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 211-13 (2012) (listing all but one of the nationally ranked 
New York City schools mentioned in prior footnote as exam schools). 
 16. See Gary Orfield et al., Better Choices for Buffalo’s Students: Expanding and 
Reforming the Criteria Schools System, Report to Buffalo Public Schools 1, 21 (May 2015), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/better-
choices-for-buffalos-students-expanding-reforming-the-criteria-schools-
system/BPS_UCLACRP_052315_v8_combined.pdf; see also James Traub, What No School 
Can Do, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/16/magazine/what-
no-school-can-do.html?pagewanted=all (“[New York City Schools] that performed poorly, 
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Similarly, pupils in Chicago’s fifteen best urban schools (as measured by 
standardized test scores) were, on average, twenty percent low-income, 
while the average Chicago school’s pupils are eighty-five percent low-
income.17 Schools dominated by low-income students tend to have poor 
reputations because children raised in lower-class households tend to be 
less intellectually stimulated at home and thus are less prepared for 
school.18 As a result, students from lower-class households tend to achieve 
less even when they are in the same school as students from upper-class 
households.19 
If urban schools with middle- and upper-class students have high 
test scores, it follows that urban schools have bad reputations primarily 
because they have more disadvantaged students than suburban schools. 
Thus, urban schools’ ability to attract middle-class parents is limited by a 
vicious circle: their social makeup leads to poor reputations,20 which scares 
off middle-class parents, which ensures a low-income student body, which 
ensures that these schools continue to have poor reputations.  
 
II. WHY ARE URBAN SCHOOLS POVERTY-PACKED? 
Urban schools are dominated by low-income students in large part 
because of school residency requirements. State and local legislation 
typically requires that in order to attend a public school in a school district, 
                                                                                                                 
like those that performed well, scored almost exactly as the socioeconomic status of the 
children in them would have predicted. You could have predicted the fourth-grade test 
scores of all but one of the city’s 32 districts merely by knowing the percentage of students 
in a given district who qualified for a free lunch. Only a few dozen of the city’s 675 
elementary schools scored well despite high poverty rates. In other words, good schools 
aren’t doing that much good, and bad schools aren’t doing that much harm.”). 
 17. See Daniel Hertz, Gentrification’s Impact on Neighborhood Schools’ Success 
(Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.chicago-bureau.org/op-ed-gentrifications-impact-on-
neighborhood-schools-success (referring to neighborhood schools in which more than 
twenty-five percent of students achieved a standardized test score that “exceeds standards” 
and is thus on track for college); see also id. 
 18. See Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just An Environmental Issue, 84 
MARQ. L. REV. 301, 324 (2000) (quoting statements by numerous social scientists that the 
quality of schooling accounts for less than half of the variation in students’ academic 
performance). 
 19. Id. at 324-25 (citing examples). 
 20. And sometimes school discipline problems as well. Rightly or wrongly, many 
middle-class parents associate poverty-stricken urban schools with high levels of violence 
and disruptiveness. Cf. Michelle Parthum, Using Litigation to Address Violence in Urban 
Public Schools, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2011) (discussing “everyday violence of 
inner-city schools”). 
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you must live in that district.21 Even the most prosperous central cities 
generally have more poor people than many of their suburbs.22 If, as 
suggested above, diverse schools usually have worse reputations than 
schools full of middle-income students, most urban schools will therefore 
have worse reputations than most suburban schools. 
But neighborhood poverty alone does not explain why entire urban 
school districts have bad reputations. If a school’s student body always 
reflected its neighborhood, schools in affluent parts of a city would have 
“good” schools (by that I mean schools that had high test scores and were 
perceived by parents as desirable) even if most city schools were 
undesirable. However, this is only the case where such schools draw their 
student bodies only from affluent neighborhoods.23 But some school 
attendance zones draw from a larger, more socially diverse geographic 
area.24 As a result, even schools in affluent urban areas sometimes scare off 
middle-class parents. 
In the late twentieth century, federal courts inadvertently 
exacerbated this problem through their often-futile efforts to desegregate 
urban public schools. In the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of 
Education,25 the Supreme Court prohibited government-mandated 
segregation of local schools. White parents were not eager, however, to 
send their children to desegregated schools—partially because of irrational 
racism, and partially because the white middle-class parents of sixty years 
ago, like today’s middle-class parents, might have wanted to avoid schools 
filled with disadvantaged children, and most blacks then had poverty-level 
incomes.26 So, “white flight” from integrated urban schools began. In 
Washington, D.C., for example, white enrollment in city schools declined 
                                                 
 21. See Yvonne Vissing, Homeless Children and Youth: An Examination of Legal 
Challenges and Directions, 13 J. L. SOCIETY 455, 486 (2012); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 
321 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of such requirements). 
 22. See Michael Lewyn, How Real is Gentrification?, 43 REAL EST. L.J. 344, 346 
(2014) (citing examples). 
 23. See Hertz, supra note 17 (citing example). 
 24. My own life presents an example. From kindergarten through fifth grade, I 
attended Jackson Elementary, a highly reputed Atlanta neighborhood school with very few 
low-income children. But for middle school, my address put me in the attendance zone for 
Sutton, a school that drew not only from Jackson’s rich neighborhood but from poorer areas 
as well. My parents quickly pulled me out of the Atlanta public school system. 
 25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 26. In 1959, fifty-six percent of blacks lived below the poverty level, more than three 
times the white poverty level of eighteen percent. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Poverty in 
the United States: 1959 to 1968, Current Population Reports 1 (Dec. 31, 1969), available at 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/1969/demo/p60-68a.pdf. 
By contrast, today about twenty percent of blacks have poverty-level incomes, just under 
twice the white poverty level of 12.7%. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 48 
(Sarah Janssen ed. 2016). Thus, the income gap between blacks and whites was even larger 
than it is today. 
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by half between 1954 and 1963.27 These whites generally moved to 
suburbs.28 Suburban public schools were often heavily white, and thus were 
not affected by Brown. 
But Brown, standing alone, did not affect all urban schools. 
Although the Court had outlawed explicit segregation by race, it had not yet 
addressed the constitutionality of facially neutral policies that tended to 
place white students in mostly-white schools. Urban school boards took 
advantage of this loophole by gerrymandering the boundaries of school 
attendance zones.29 For example, in Kansas City, Missouri, the school 
board frequently shifted white neighborhoods from integrated attendance 
zones to nearby zones full of predominantly white schools.30 The school 
district also placed new schools in areas that were all-white or all-black.31 
So in the late 1950s and early 1960s, whites in the most integrated 
neighborhoods were still subject to desegregation, but other urban whites 
could still send their children to almost all-white schools. As a result, public 
schools promoted “white flight” only in cities’ more diverse neighborhoods. 
But in the 1968 case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County,32 the Court outlawed a “freedom of choice” plan that permitted 
each pupil to choose his or her school on the ground that the plan had failed 
to achieve desegregation.33 And in the 1971 case of Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,34 the Court suggested that evidence of 
segregation included “building new schools in the areas of white suburban 
expansion farthest from Negro population centers.”35 The Court added that 
lower courts could remedy such pro-segregation policies by altering 
attendance boundaries or busing students across a city in order to achieve 
racial integration.36 So after Green and Swann, any school district that had 
                                                 
 27. See RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN 16 (1992) (enrollment declined 
from just over 40,000 students to just under 19,000 students). Although other forces 
contributed to suburbanization, white enrollment declined especially rapidly in the years 
after Brown. For example, between 1951 and 1954, white enrollment declined by about ten 
percent (from 45,682 to 40,927 students), but between 1954 and 1957, white enrollment 
declined by over twenty percent (from 40,927 students to 31,626 students). Id. 
 28. Id. at 292 (“almost all of the white flight was to suburban public schools”). 
 29. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE 
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING 25 (2002). For example, in Washington, 
twelve of the thirteen elementary schools west of Rock Creek Park were eighty-five percent 
white; see also WOLTERS, supra note 27, at 30. 
 30. See KEVIN FOX GOTHAM, RACE, REAL ESTATE AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 104-05 
(2d ed. 2015). 
 31. Id. at 107. 
 32. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 33. Id. at 439 (lower courts must “assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in 
achieving desegregation”). 
 34. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 35. Id. at 21. 
 36. Id. at 27-29; see also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (explicitly 
prohibiting race-conscious attendance zones). 
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sought to keep white children in majority white schools could avoid or 
resolve lawsuits only by making every school racially integrated.37 Because 
most urban school districts had at some point in time enacted such 
policies,38 this category included most urban school districts. 
The courts’ new emphasis on racial balance meant that even in the 
most affluent neighborhoods, urban whites could not send their children to 
racially and socially homogenous schools. As a result, “white flight” from 
urban schools continued. By 1973, many urban school districts were 
already majority black.39 Ultimately, racial integration became impossible 
in some urban school systems. For example, if a school system was ninety 
percent black, nearly every school in the system would be overwhelmingly 
black. 
The courts could have responded with “metropolitan 
desegregation”—forcing suburban schools as well as city schools to be 
racially balanced—thus reducing white parents’ incentives to move to 
suburbia. But in the 1974 case of Milliken v. Bradley,40 the Supreme Court 
rejected this remedy, holding that as long as a suburb had not segregated its 
own schools, it had committed no constitutional violation and thus was not 
required to participate in school desegregation.41 As a practical matter, this 
meant that if a suburb had no (or almost no) black children and thus had 
never sought to segregate them, it was not required to maintain racially 
balanced schools. 
So, after Milliken, urban parents were faced with this choice: they 
could stay in urban schools as those schools continued to become blacker 
(and thus, given the high rates of poverty among urban blacks, poorer), or 
they could move their children to overwhelmingly white suburbs that were 
not subject to constant judicial supervision. Not surprisingly, most white 
parents chose the latter option. For example, in Boston, the site of an 
especially controversial busing plan, the city’s juvenile white population 
declined by more than half during the 1970s alone—despite the fact that the 
                                                 
 37. See STEARNS, supra note 29, at 26. 
 38. See Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith and Metropolitan Segregation, 62 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 364, 379 (2015) (noting that southern school districts required racial 
segregation, while in northern school districts “widespread discriminatory 
practices . . . including racially gerrymandered attendance boundaries, optional attendance 
zones that allowed whites to avoid racially diverse schools, and school construction and 
expansion decisions made in locations that prevented student integration from occurring”). 
 39. Id. at 390 (noting that decline of white enrollment was already widespread); id. at 
400 (Detroit schools seventy-two percent black); WOLTERS, supra note 27, at 16 
(Washington already ninety-five percent black); ADRIENNE D. DIXON & CELIA K. ROUSSEAU, 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND EDUCATION: ALL GOD’S CHILDREN GOT A SONG 118 (2014) 
(only thirty-three percent of Memphis students white). 
 40. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 41. Id. at 745 (finding no constitutional violations by school districts in Detroit 
suburbs). Cf. Orfield, supra note 38, at 406-16 (criticizing decision). 
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city’s single adult white population declined by only three percent.42 
Similarly, in the dozen years after the federal courts required Washington, 
D.C. to integrate all of its schools, its white public school population 
declined by seventy percent, while the single adult white population 
decreased by only six percent.43 Eventually, many black middle-class 
parents followed suit.44 In some places, racial segregation actually increased 
during the age of so-called desegregation: in the Northeast, the percentage 
of blacks in majority white schools actually declined between 1968 and 
1980.45 
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court dismantled many desegregation 
orders issued by lower courts, holding that the urban school districts 
involved had done as much as possible to desegregate their schools.46 In 
fact, the Court now holds that where no desegregation order is in effect, the 
Constitution may prohibit school districts from considering a school’s 
racial balance when assigning students.47 This means that school districts 
may not gerrymander school boundaries either to promote or to prevent 
racial balance. But the damage to cities has been done: urban school 
districts are stuck with high poverty rates and bad reputations and (despite 
the occasional wave of gentrification) are rarely attracting middle-class 
parents. 
It could be argued that the rise of gentrification is making urban 
public schools attractive to middle-class parents again and that the anti-
urban policies of the late twentieth century are no longer relevant.48 But as 
Table 2 shows, large urban school districts continue to have miniscule 
white enrollments and high levels of low-income students. 
 
 
                                                 
 42. See Lewyn, supra note 18, at 328. Thus, it seems unlikely that white flight was 
unrelated to public schools. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Orfield, supra note 38, at 432 (describing suburbanization among nonwhites). 
 45. Id. at 422 (noting decline from thirty-three percent to twenty percent). However, 
this percentage increased modestly in the South and Midwest. Id. Orfield explains that the 
South has more countywide school districts, which means that whites would have to travel 
significantly further to find a suburban district to flee to. Id. at 421. 
 46. Id. at 420. 
 47. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732 
(2007) (plurality opinion) (“[R]acial balancing is not permitted.”). I note, however, that the 
reach of this decision is unclear. A four-justice plurality flatly rejected the consideration of 
racial balancing, while Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is less clear. Id. at 782, 787-89 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (desegregation plan at issue not “narrowly tailored to achieve its 
own ends” and thus unconstitutional; however, schools may adopt race-conscious measures 
in order to achieve a diverse student body). 
 48. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 1, at 698 (“While urban schools in most gentrifying 
areas are still undoubtedly predominately minority and poor, an increasing number of young 
middle-class white residents with children are deciding to give the urban public schools a 
chance.”). 
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TABLE 2: Race and Class in Urban49 School Districts for Selected50 
Older Cities51 
 Percent low-income 
(that is, eligible for 
subsidized school 
lunch) 
 
Percent white non-
Hispanic 
New York 66.1 15.0 
 
Chicago 84.9 9.2 
 
Philadelphia 85.5 14.3 
 
San Francisco 57.5 10.8 
 
Detroit 81.0 2.6 
 
Washington 53.8 11.5 
 
Boston 71.7 13.2 
 
Baltimore 84.1 8.0 
 
Milwaukee 82.3 13.9 
 
Minneapolis 65.7 36.4 
 
Cleveland Not available 14.8 
 
St. Louis 68.4 9.9 
                                                 
 49. By “urban” I mean school districts limited to a major city, as opposed to suburban 
districts or countywide districts which include both a city and its suburbs (such as Los 
Angeles United, which includes some suburbs as well as the city of Los Angeles). 
 50. In particular, this table includes cities with available relevant data that: (1) are 
“inelastic” cities (that is, cities that are unable to annex their suburbs, and thus trapped 
within their mid-twentieth century boundaries); and (2) had over 500,000 people in 1950. 
See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS: A CENSUS 2010 PERSPECTIVE 75 (2013) 
(defining “inelastic” cities); THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS , supra note 26, at 
614 (listing cities’ 1950 populations). I focus on these cities because elastic cities are often 
in less dire shape; a city that can annex hundreds of square miles may, by taking over its 
suburbs, make “white flight” inconvenient. Cf. supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting 
that geographically enormous counties were able to integrate schools). 
 51. Digest of Education Statistics, Table 215.10, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION 
STATISTICS (2014), 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_215.10.asp?current=yes. 
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Pittsburgh 69.4 33.6 
 
Cincinnati 65.3 26.8 
 
Buffalo  74.9 22.2 
 
In sum, parents seek suburban schools because urban public 
schools have bad reputations. Urban schools have bad reputations because 
many of their children come from disadvantaged backgrounds. As a result, 
these children are less prepared for school than middle-class children. 
These schools have a high concentration of poverty due to the structure of 
state and local attendance zone laws, which ensure that a city’s schools 
must be at least as diverse as their juvenile populations. The concentration 
of poverty is also a result of the federal courts’ school desegregation 
rulings, which prevented cities from creating separate zones for their 
whitest, most affluent neighborhoods. Thus, government at all levels is 
responsible for the low status of urban schools. 
III. USEFUL BUT IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS 
As long as affluent suburbs are allowed to create separate school 
districts,52 there may be no easy way to make poverty-packed municipalities 
more popular. However, urban life could become more popular if the 
government broke the link between residence and schooling. If this was the 
case, parental choice would expand, for city residents would not be limited 
to public schools in urban neighborhoods. If the government subsidizes 
your health insurance through Medicare (or you benefit from some other 
form of government-subsidized insurance), you are not limited to attending 
                                                 
 52. I note, however, that state or federal authorities could quickly eliminate the 
“school-generated sprawl” problem by eliminating this option. If a state or region wished to 
make every school demographically identical, it could abolish suburban school districts, 
place every school in the region in one giant school district, and assign students to schools in 
a way that ensured that every single school had the same socio-economic makeup. If this 
were the case, parents would have little incentive to move to suburbs. However, it seems to 
me that this policy would be so unpopular with suburbanites as to be beyond the realm of 
political feasibility. Moreover, in metropolitan areas that spread across hundreds or 
thousands of square miles, it might be costly as well; where rich and poor areas are ten or 
twenty miles from each other, students might have to be bused many miles to reach their 
assigned school. And in the absence of land use regulations that prevented developers from 
building suburbs outside the school district, parents might move even further into suburbia to 
escape the new super-district. On the other hand, a radically libertarian state could make 
suburbs less popular by simply eliminating public schools; if this was the case, prestigious 
schools would be no more likely to concentrate in suburbs than any privately provided good 
or service. However, this too seems so far beyond the bounds of feasibility as to be not 
worth extended discussion. 
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the doctors or hospitals closest to your home. So why should schooling be 
any different?53 
Americans have experimented with several policies designed to 
increase school choice, including: (1) voucher systems including private 
schools; (2) “open enrollment” systems that do not affect private schools, 
but allow urban students to attend suburban public schools; (3) charter 
schools; and (4) exam schools. Each of these techniques may reduce sprawl 
if properly designed, but all have financial and social costs. 
(1). Universal Vouchers  
The most market-oriented, anti-sprawl education policy is some 
form of a voucher system. Under the purest form of a voucher system, 
parents who choose to avoid public schools would be “given a voucher, a 
piece of paper redeemable for a designated sum of money if, and only if, it 
is used to pay the cost of schooling your child at an approved school.”54 If 
vouchers were extended to private schools, parents would arguably have 
little reason to avoid city neighborhoods; they could stay in the city and 
attend private schools for the same amount of money that they would spend 
on public schools (that is, zero). 
However, as long as a voucher system supported both private 
schools and existing public schools, two practical difficulties might make 
the system either less effective or more costly. First, some private schools 
are more expensive than public schools. Public schools spend roughly 
$11,000 per pupil55—roughly comparable to the average private school 
tuition.56 However, many private schools are far more expensive. The 
average nonreligious private school costs $17,000 per year57 and some 
                                                 
 53. Admittedly, one significant difference exists between medicine and education: 
because most patients only occasionally seek medical attention, there is no reason why a 
patient must commit to seeing the same doctor or hospital every day. By contrast, children 
attend school every day for half a year; as a result, a school needs to know in advance how 
many children to plan for. Otherwise, schools would be overwhelmed if the number of 
pupils suddenly increased from week to week. Thus, schools need to know their student 
bodies near the start of an academic year. But current residency requirements are not 
necessary to achieve this goal. If students throughout a city or region were allowed to choose 
schools a few months before the first day of classes, schools would know the size of their 
student bodies a few months in advance and could govern themselves accordingly. 
 54. MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 161 (1980). 
 55. See Public Education Finances: 2014, supra note 6, at 28. Of the 100 largest 
school systems, only about twenty spend more than this amount. Id. at 25-26. 
 56. See Average Private School Tuition Cost (2016-17), PRIVATE SCHOOL REVIEW, at 
http://www.privateschoolreview.com/tuition-stats/private-school-cost-by-state (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2017). 
 57. See Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1774 n.291 (2012). 
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charge as much as $20,000 to $30,000 tuition.58 It logically follows that if 
vouchers covered the entire cost of private school tuition, educational costs 
to taxpayers would increase. 
On the other hand, if vouchers merely covered the cost of the 
average public school, they might cover less than half of some private 
schools’ tuition—arguably not enough to discourage most parents from 
choosing suburban public schools.59 But even so, such a partial discount 
would still do something to encourage parents to stay in cities and would 
thus improve upon the status quo.60 
A second difficulty is that even a limited voucher system might 
increase municipal costs, because the government’s public school expenses 
would not decrease as fast as its private school expenses would increase. 
Imagine a voucher system in which the money follows the child—that is, if 
each voucher is $10,000, and a school loses a child to a private school, that 
school loses $10,000. Some of the public schools’ costs are presumably 
fixed, such as the costs of buildings and maintenance.61 So if a public 
school that spends $10,000 per pupil loses ten pupils under a voucher 
system, its costs will decrease by less than $100,000. 
A voucher system that fails to account for this difficulty might 
starve public schools that lose students, causing those schools to lose 
resources or even be closed due to fiscal scarcity—a result that may be 
harmful for students in those schools and that may even make declining 
                                                 
 58. See, e.g., Tuition & Financial Assistance, ATLANTA JEWISH ACADEMY, 
http://www.atljewishacademy.org/admissions/161-tuition-financial-assistance (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2017) (high school tuition just over $24,000); Tuition, NICHOLS SCHOOL, 
https://www.nicholsschool.org/admissions/international-students/tuition (last visited Mar. 
27, 2017) (similar tuition at secular private school in Buffalo); Tuition & Fees For The 
2016-17 School Year, JACK M. BARRACK HEBREW ACADEMY, 
https://www.jbha.org/admissions/tuition-and-fees.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (high 
school tuition just over $30,000). But cf. Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The 
Structure of School Choice, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 572 (2008) (Milwaukee vouchers of 
$6,000 per child “enough to pay for tuition at virtually all private schools in that city”). 
 59. I note that voucher systems actually in existence are generally targeted towards the 
poor or to special-needs students. Moe, supra note 58, at 569-70 (citing examples); Lewyn, 
supra note 18, at 372 n.515 (citing other examples). However, these programs are irrelevant 
to the purpose of this Article, which is to discuss programs that might encourage middle-
class families to stay in cities. 
 60. My discussion assumes, of course, that parents of children at more expensive 
schools would be able to add vouchers onto their school tuition. Some commentators oppose 
such “add-ons” because they wish to prevent more affluent parents from buying their way 
into more expensive schools. See Moe, supra note 58, at 573. This argument might make 
sense in the context of a voucher program designed to help poor people escape failing urban 
schools. But a prohibition on “add-ons” makes no sense in the context of an anti-sprawl 
program, since a major purpose of the program is to encourage affluent parents to stay in 
cities. 
 61. Id. at 579. 
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schools’ neighborhoods less desirable.62 To prevent this outcome, a pro-
voucher city has two choices: to keep public school spending constant (thus 
increasing overall education spending) or to fund private schools at some 
level below the average per pupil expenditure in order to reduce fiscal harm 
to public schools. Under the latter scenario, parents would be able to save 
less private school tuition than would otherwise be the case, thus reducing 
the anti-sprawl impact of vouchers. 
(2). Public Schools Only 
As noted above, a voucher program that includes private schools 
would either be more costly than the status quo or would be somewhat 
limited; more costly if it funded all private school tuition or more limited if 
it only partially funded some schools’ tuition. 
By contrast, a school choice program limited to public schools 
would avoid these fiscal problems, for the state could simply forbid public 
school districts from discriminating on the basis of residence. If a popular 
school district wanted to avoid radical increases in enrollment, it would 
have to use a lottery to decide which students were admitted. This plan 
might discourage sprawl by making prestigious suburban schools available 
to urban parents. If both students from affluent families and students from 
poor families entered these schools, the class differences between urban and 
suburban schools might be erased in the long run. Such an open enrollment 
program might actually be more egalitarian than the status quo. 
A school choice program limited to public schools may be even 
more politically infeasible than universal vouchers for two reasons. First, it 
would require a considerable investment (either public or private) in 
transportation, since students in search of good schools might wish to go all 
over a metropolitan area. Either government will have to buy many more 
school buses or parents will have to spend a lot more time transporting their 
children to faraway schools. Second, suburbanites will be unwilling to pay 
property taxes for schools that other people’s children will attend.63 Thus, 
                                                 
 62. Cf. Wilson, supra note 1, at 712 (criticizing closure of schools in distressed 
neighborhoods because even academically deficient schools are “one of the most stable 
institutions in poor minority urban areas” and vacant school buildings “can exacerbate blight 
[and] become a magnet for crime”). It could be argued that these schools should be allowed 
to close. But if, as suggested above, a school’s perceived quality reflects its social makeup, 
when low-income students of failing schools move to a nearby school, that school could 
become equally undesirable. If this was the case, the students who switched schools would 
still be in a failing, unpopular school, and be would be stuck with a longer commute. 
 63. See Aaron Y. Tang, Privileges and Immunities, Public Education, and the Case for 
Public School Choice, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1134-35 (2011). For example, suburban 
school districts refused to accept students under Cleveland’s voucher program; apparently, 
they did not want urban children even if the state paid their expenses. See Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 739, 747 (2002) (“None of the public schools in districts adjacent 
to Cleveland have elected to participate.”). 
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states might have to take over school financing.   
 I note that most states have in fact enacted “open enrollment” plans 
allowing some inter-district transfers.64 However, these policies are 
essentially toothless. In thirty states, school districts are not compelled to 
participate.65 Thus, suburban school districts need not accept urban 
students. Even in the remaining states, state laws contain loopholes that 
give suburbs ample discretion to reject urban students.66 For example, New 
Mexico’s statute provides: “Local school boards may admit school-age 
persons who do not live within the school district to the public schools 
within the school district when there are sufficient school accommodations 
to provide for them.”67 Thus, suburban school districts can easily exclude 
urbanites by claiming insufficient “accommodations.”68 Moreover, open 
enrollment statutes do not grant students the right to be transported across 
district lines, which means that students will not be able to attend an out-of-
district school unless parents transport them.69 Thus, existing open 
enrollment laws do not make it particularly easy for urban students to attend 
suburban schools and, therefore, do not eliminate the pro-sprawl bias of 
education law. 
(3). Charter Schools 
Since the first charter school opened in 1991, forty-two states have 
authorized charter schools.70 A charter school is a hybrid between a private 
school and a public school. Charters are publicly financed to some extent71 
and do not charge tuition,72 but they often receive less public money than 
traditional public schools.73 These schools are governed by their trustees 
rather than by public officials and are exempt from most personnel rules 
                                                 
 64. See Tang, supra note 63, at 1113 (“forty-two states have enacted policies 
authorizing some form of inter-district open enrollment”). 
 65. Id. at 1114. 
 66. Id. 
 67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-5(A) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 68. See Tang, supra note 63, at 1115 (budgetary considerations are major motive for 
districts’ refusal to allow inter-district transfers). 
 69. Id. at 1119. 
 70. See Preston C. Green III et al., The Legal Status of Charter Schools in State 
Statutory Law, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 240, 243 (2014). 
 71. Id. at 261-63 (discussing litigation over charter schools’ use of public funds). 
 72. See Wendy Parker, From the Failure of Desegregation to the Failure of Choice, 
40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117, 125 (2012). 
 73. See Noelle Quam, Big Philanthropy’s Unrestrained Influence on Public 
Education: A Call for Change, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 601, 621 (2015) 
(“On average, charter schools receive sixty-one percent of the government funding that their 
district counterparts receive.”). 
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governing public schools74 as well as from state laws governing student 
discipline.75 
In theory, charter schools, like private schools financed by 
vouchers, could provide a palatable alternative to urban public schools, 
causing middle-class parents to shun suburban public schools.76 But in fact, 
the majority of charter school students are low-income,77 and charter 
schools tend to have academic achievement levels roughly comparable to 
those of nearby public schools.78 
Why have charter schools generally failed to attract middle-class 
parents? States generally do not allow charters to choose their students. 
Instead, state laws generally provide that when a charter cannot 
accommodate all interested families, it must either follow a “first come, 
first served” admissions policy or use a lottery to choose its students.79 
From an egalitarian perspective, this policy makes sense because it prevents 
charters from becoming enclaves dominated by the privileged.80 
But from a “sprawl control” perspective, this policy is less helpful. 
If charters are not selective, they will often have student bodies that 
resemble traditional urban public schools (as is in fact the case).81 If parents 
do not wish to send their children to poverty-packed urban public schools, 
they will also not wish to send their children to poverty-packed urban 
charter schools. 
One possible alternative is state legislation allowing charters to be 
as academically selective as private schools or urban “exam schools.”82 If 
                                                 
 74. See Green et al., supra note 70, at 243. 
 75. Id. at 265-67; see also Kaylee Niemasik, Teen Pregnancy in Charter Schools: 
Pregnancy Discrimination Challenges Under The Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, 22 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 55, 60-61 (2015). 
 76. It could also be argued that competition from charter schools forces public schools 
to improve in order to retain students. See Niemasik, supra note 75, at 60. Because this 
article is about urbanism rather than education policy, the wisdom of that argument is 
beyond the scope of the article. 
 77. Id. (fifty-four percent of charter school pupils low-income). Similarly, only thirty-
nine percent of charter school students are white, as opposed to fifty-six percent of students 
in traditional public schools. See Parker, supra note 72, at 138 n.100. 
 78. Parker, supra note 72, at 150. 
 79. Id. at 125. 
 80. But cf. Wilson, supra note 1, at 713 (arguing that lotteries are insufficiently 
egalitarian because “gentrified families who tend to have more time, resources and cultural 
capital to navigate the lottery process are more likely to apply and gain admission to the 
better charter schools”). I note that charter schools are in a no-win position from the 
perspective of egalitarian critics: if they enroll middle-class families, they exclude the 
poor—but if they do not, they are just another way to concentrate poverty. 
 81. In fact, charter schools are more heavily nonwhite than, and may be even more 
racially segregated than, traditional urban public schools. See Parker, supra note 72, at 138 
n.100 (only thirty-nine percent of charter school students white, as opposed to fifty-six 
percent of traditional public school students); id. at 140-42. 
 82. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing exam schools). 
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this was the case, charter schools might look like urban private schools: less 
selective schools might continue to be dominated by the disadvantaged, but 
the most selective schools would attract middle-class parents who wished to 
stay in the city but avoid typical urban public schools. 
On the other hand, if existing charter schools were to convert to 
selective charters, charter slots for weaker students might disappear, thus 
reducing choices for such students.83 If this was the case, selective charter 
schools could actually reduce some parents’ educational choices. It is 
unclear to what extent this would occur; individual schools would have to 
weigh their desire to attract middle-class pupils against their desire to fill as 
many seats as possible. 
(4). Exam Schools 
As noted above, some urban school districts have academically 
selective “exam schools” that achieve results better than those of most 
suburban schools.84 Why have these exam schools failed to attract most 
middle-class parents? 
Most cities’ exam school systems are insufficient to meet potential 
demand for two reasons. First, exam schools are often limited to high 
school. For example, St. Louis’s only exam school is a high school, as are 
seven of Chicago’s eight exam schools and all of the exam schools in 
Baltimore, Washington, Detroit, and Cleveland.85 Almost no exam school 
begins in the early grades; of the over 200 exam schools listed in one book 
about the subject, only six begin before fourth grade.86 But by the time their 
children reach high school age (or even middle school age), some middle-
class parents have already moved to suburbia. So for exam schools to 
attract middle-class parents, they should begin in the early grades. 
Second, there are not enough exam schools to meet potential 
middle-class demand. For example, St. Louis has just over 7,000 people 
enrolled in its high schools,87 but its lone exam school, Metro High 
School,88 has only 335 students.89 Similarly, Buffalo’s City Honors (the 
                                                 
 83. Cf. Wilson, supra note 1, at 713 (suggesting that this is already the case because 
“charter schools tend to deny students with behavioral problems and students with 
disabilities” and public schools have less money to educate such students as a result of 
competition from charter schools). 
 84. See FINN & HOCKETT, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 85. See id. at 205-14. 
 86. Id. at 205-15. 
 87. See MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., St. Louis City, 
http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/District%20and%20School%20Information/Missour
i%20School%20Directory.aspx?rp:DistrictCode=115115 (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).  
 88. See FINN & HOCKETT, supra note 15, at 209. 
 89. See St. Louis City, supra note 87 (go to “St. Louis City-Summary Reports,” then to 
“School District Report Card-Building,” then find Metro High). 
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city’s lone exam school, which begins in fifth grade)90 has just over 1,000 
students,91 about six percent of the city’s fifth through twelfth grade 
enrollment.92 In these school districts, children who are not among the top 
five percent of students must attend the less prestigious traditional public 
schools. A family deciding whether to invest in a city might be able to 
guess with reasonable certainty whether its children will be among the top 
fifty percent of district children, but might not be able to guess whether 
their children will be among the top five percent. It logically follows that a 
school district wishing to lure parents to suburbia should probably have 
enough exam schools to accommodate a much higher number of children—
perhaps the top quarter or top third. 
However, creating new schools might be more expensive than 
allowing the formation of charter schools. Charter schools are only partially 
publicly financed,93 while exam schools are completely publicly financed 
and thus a bigger drain on governmental resources. To avoid increasing 
overall education spending, a school system might be tempted to reduce 
spending on the remaining non-exam schools. Because the latter schools 
would contain the hardest-to-educate students, reducing spending on such 
schools might be inequitable and even counterproductive in the long run 
(assuming arguendo that reduced school spending in fact led to reduced life 
opportunities for the non-exam school students). 
(5). Choice vs. Equity 
It could be argued that all of these proposals could increase social 
segregation, for if urban middle-class parents are allowed to choose 
selective schools (whether they be private, public, or charter), these schools 
might be almost entirely middle- or upper-class.94 If this was the case, 
children from lower-income households might be stuck in hyper-
segregated, homogenously poor schools. But this concern accurately 
describes the status quo: poor children are stuck in troubled schools in cities 
and low-income suburbs, and most other children attend middle-class 
                                                 
 90. See FINN & HOCKETT, supra note 15, at 211. 
 91. See City Honors Sch-F Masten Park Enrollment (2014-2015),  
https://data.nysed.gov/enrollment.php?year=2015&instid=800000052908 (last visited Mar. 
27, 2017). 
 92. See Buffalo City School District Enrollment (2014-2015),  
https://data.nysed.gov/enrollment.php?year=2015&instid=800000052968 (last visited Mar. 
27, 2017) (total enrollment 18,764). 
 93. See supra notes 71 & 73 and accompanying text. 
 94. I note, however, that this is not currently true of exam schools. See FINN & 
HOCKETT, supra note 15, at 32 (students in exam schools generally about as likely to be 
eligible for subsidized lunches as all public high school students); id. at 33-34 (fifty-two 
percent of Chicago exam school students, fifty-one percent of Philadelphia exam school 
students, forty-six percent of Washington, D.C. exam schools students, and forty-one percent 
of Boston exam school students eligible). 
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suburban schools. Unless the state or federal government wipes out 
homogenously affluent suburban schools,95 segregation by social class is 
inevitable. Our only choice is whether to continue the current system of 
separate municipalities for the poor and the middle and upper classes 
(which combines school segregation and residential segregation) or whether 
to allow affluent parents to attend the middle-class schools they crave 
without moving to suburbs.96 Even if the latter system causes the same 
amount of school segregation as the status quo, neighborhoods would be 
less segregated because some parents who are unwilling to send their 
children to diverse schools might be willing to live in diverse 
neighborhoods. 
It could also be argued that if school boards hired the right teachers 
or created the right curriculum, middle-class households would choose even 
the most socially diverse schools over suburbia. One way of testing this 
theory is to examine the most successful charter schools. If better teachers 
could bring the middle-class back to urban schools, the best urban charters 
would have achieved this goal. But, in fact, this has not consistently been 
the case. For example, the film “Waiting for Superman” describes Locke 
High School and KIPP LA Prep School in Los Angeles as unusually 
successful charter schools.97 But in both schools, over ninety percent of 
students are still poor enough to be eligible for government-subsidized 
lunches.98 Thus, it seems unlikely that education reform alone will solve the 
problem of school-related sprawl. 
A related argument is that if schools spent more on social services, 
urban schools would improve enough to become attractive to middle-class 
                                                 
 95. See supra note 52 (discussing this option). 
 96. Or homogenously middle- and upper-class city neighborhoods. See Wilson, supra 
note 1, at 715 (suggesting that Washington, D.C. has altered school attendance zones to 
exclude lower-class students from city’s best performing middle and high schools); Hertz, 
supra note 17 (noting that Chicago’s most affluent areas tend to have city’s highest test 
scores). 
 97. See Diane Ravitch, The Success of Charter Schools is A Myth, in MARGARET 
HAERENS & LYNN M. ZOTT, CHARTER SCHOOLS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 34, 38, 45 (2012). 
 98. See KIPP Los Angeles College Preparatory School, GREATSCHOOLS, 
http://www.greatschools.org/california/los-angeles/12371-KIPP-Los-Angeles-College-
Preparatory-School/details/#Students (last updated Mar. 22, 2017) (ninety-three percent of 
students eligible for reduced-price lunches); Alain Leroy Locke College Prep Academy, 
GREATSCHOOLS, http://www.greatschools.org/california/los-angeles/24830-Alain-Leroy-
Locke-College-Prep-Academy/details/#Students (last updated Mar. 22, 2017) (ninety-one 
percent). I note that these schools also have test scores well below those of prestigious 
suburban schools—a fact suggesting the difficulty of overcoming the problems caused by a 
poor home environment. 2015 Test Results for English Language Arts/Literacy and 
Mathematics, CALIFORNIA ASSESSMENT OF STUDENT PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS, 
http://caaspp.cde.ca.gov/sb2015/Search (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (Thirteen percent of 
KIPP students and three percent of Locke students reached highest “Standard Exceeded” 
score in reading, as opposed to thirty-six percent in suburban Beverly Vista Elementary 
School and thirty-one percent in suburban Beverly Hills High.). 
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parents. For example, one commentator writes that Cincinnati has improved 
test scores through adding “health care, counseling, adult education, and 
cultural events . . . [in] community learning centers.”99 In other words, more 
spending yields better results, which in turn brings middle-class people into 
the school system. 
It may be true that Cincinnati’s schools have improved modestly in 
recent years. Although the state of Ohio’s “Report Card” for that school 
district is dominated by Ds and Fs, some of the district’s test scores have 
improved.100 Nevertheless, any argument based on Cincinnati’s alleged 
success fails for several reasons. First, as noted above, there is little 
correlation between a school district’s spending level and its prestige: urban 
school districts that spend more than their suburbs nevertheless fail to 
attract middle-class students.101 Second, the claim overlooks the nationwide 
failure of social spending to prevent middle-class flight from urban schools: 
during the late twentieth century, government spending on education and 
other social services increased massively102—yet middle-class flight 
continued to occur.103 Third, the use of Cincinnati’s improvement to 
support the argument that increased government spending improves 
education rests on a slender factual basis: between 2012 and 2015, 
education spending in Cincinnati actually decreased from $14,719 per pupil 
to $13,626 per pupil.104 Also, between 2007 and 2015, Cincinnati’s 
spending increased but by less than the statewide average. Cincinnati’s 
spending increased from $12,021 per pupil to $13,626 per pupil (a sixteen 
percent increase), while in the average Ohio school district, spending 
increased from $9,343 per pupil to $10,973 per pupil (a seventeen percent 
                                                 
 99. Wilson, supra note 1, at 730. 
 100. Cincinnati City School District, 2014-15, Ohio School Report Cards 1, (Aug. 21, 
2016), available at 
http://reportcard.education.ohio.gov/Archives%20TS/043752/043752/043752_2014-
2015_DIST.pdf (giving the Cincinnati school district an F for graduation rates, achievement 
indicators met, and closing racial gaps, but giving the district an A on “value added”—that 
is, yearly progress for grades four through eight). 
 101. See supra Tables 1 & 2 (city districts outspend suburban districts). 
 102. See Digest of Education Statistics, Table 164, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
(May 1995) https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d95/dtab164.asp (spending per pupil tripled 
in constant dollars between 1959 and 1990); AXEL R. SCHAFER, PIETY AND PUBLIC FUNDING: 
EVANGELICALS AND THE STATE IN MODERN AMERICA 42-44 (2012) (describing increases in 
other social service spending). 
 103. It could be argued that without such spending increases, urban schools would be 
even worse. But even if this was so, it seems clear that this benefit was inadequate to prevent 
middle-class parents from preferring suburban schools. 
 104. See District Profile Reports (Cupp Report), OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., CTR. FOR SCH. 
FIN., http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Finance-and-Funding/School-Payment-
Reports/District-Profile-Reports (last updated Feb. 28, 2017) (data for FY 2012 and 2015). 
For data on an individual year, click the links on the page for a specific year. Then to find 
data on a specific school district, go to the links in the middle of the yearly report. 
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increase).105 Fourth, Cincinnati was not appreciably more successful in 
attracting middle-class students; the percentage of low-income students 
decreased between 2008 and 2014, but only from 67.8%106 to 65.3%.107 
CONCLUSION 
Every conceivable school assignment policy involves trade-offs 
between cost, urbanism, choice, and equity. The current system discourages 
urban life, provides limited choices, and is highly inequitable (insofar as it 
limits educational opportunities for urban students). However, it may be 
less costly than some alternatives. 
A voucher system that pays all students’ private school tuition 
would maximize parental choice and maximize parental ability to escape 
troubled urban schools, but would be highly costly. A system that pays a 
fixed amount regardless of a school’s tuition would be cheaper but would 
do less to discourage sprawl. Under that system, many private schools 
would continue to be more expensive than suburban public schools. 
A “public schools only” voucher system would be highly 
egalitarian in that even students who would not gain admission to 
academically selective private schools would be eligible for the program. In 
addition, such an open enrollment system would increase parental choice 
and might effectively enable parents to escape troubled urban schools. 
However, spending on transportation costs might increase. In particular, 
public spending would increase if the government funded more buses to 
suburbia, and private spending on cars would increase otherwise. 
By contrast, there is no obvious reason why selective charter 
schools would be more costly than the status quo. However, their impact on 
urbanism is less predictable. If Americans created selective urban charter 
schools in large numbers, such schools might successfully compete with 
suburban public schools. But if existing charter schools turn into selective 
schools, choice might be impaired for students who would be unable to 
attend such schools. 
The creation of more exam schools would avoid this problem. A 
city that built new exam schools would by definition be creating more 
choices for parents—choices that would cater to high achievers and thus 
make urban schools more appealing for middle-class parents. So urbanism 
and choice favor this policy. On the other hand, any educational expansion 
creates a difficult trade-off between cost and equity: new schools would be 
costly unless financed on the backs of existing schools. 
                                                 
 105. Id. (data for FY 2006 and FY 2015). 
 106. See Digest of Education Statistics, Table 94, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS 
(Oct. 2010), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_094.asp (2008 data). 
 107. See supra Table 2. 
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In sum, there is a wide variety of school reforms that would make 
urban life more palatable to middle-class parents—but no reform is cost-
free. 
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